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WHERE HAVE ALL THE SOLDIERS GONE?
OBSERVATIONS ON THE DECLINE OF
MILITARY VETERANS IN
GOVERNMENT
Donald N. Zillman*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Essay examines the consequences of the growing decline in
the number of military veterans in positions of leadership in the fed-
eral government, most particularly in the United States Congress.
In its visible form, this issue has given rise to popular debate in the
last three presidential elections. Did Dan Quayle pull strings to get
a safe post in the Indiana National Guard to avoid Vietnam service?
Did Bill Clinton improperly evade the draft during Vietnam? Were
veterans George Bush or Bob Dole better qualified to be President
because of their combat service in World War II? In its less visible,
but more important, form the issue raises significant questions about
civilian control of the military, one of our most fundamental, but
often ignored, precepts of constitutional law.
We enter a unique period in American history. For 150 years-
from approximately the adoption of the Constitution to World War
II-America built its military for wartime and dismantled it when
peace returned. America mobilized, during the Civil War or the
World Wars, was a military power with which to be reckoned.
America disarmed was a slight threat to anyone, including the
American people.
All that changed with World War II and the Cold War. A brief
demobilization following World War II was reversed under the pres-
sure of the Cold War and Korea. America became the world's fore-
most military power, a fact which may not have been fully
appreciated by the American people until the remarkable period of
1989-1991 in which America peaceably achieved its objectives in the
Cold War and violently achieved domination of one of the non-
Western world's major combat-tested armies in Operation Desert
Storm.
The world of 1997 shows few signs that the American military can
return to the small, isolated force it was for much of the first century
* Dean and Edward Godfrey Professor of Law, University of Maine School of
Law. My thanks to Laura Ross, Class of 1994, Michelle Kane, Class of 1996, and
Brooke Porteous and Alison Beyea, Class of 1997, for their assistance in the
researching of this Article. Ms. Kristi Clifford of the law school staff provided her
usual superb technical assistance. Earlier versions of this paper were presented to
the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society and to the United States
Army Judge Advocate General's School.
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and a half of the American experience. Despite the collapse of the
Soviet Union, the world remains a dangerous place. More precisely,
it remains a place where American public policy objectives demand
a world-class military. The American force is undeniably downsiz-
ing in people and dollars. But what remains has the potential to
unleash nuclear weapons on the world, to project force to any por-
tion of the globe, and to fight and win conventional and unconven-
tional wars. It is also a force that has the potential to be the
essential power of last resort in a variety of domestic concerns-
from drug control to natural disaster relief to urban riot.
What has changed markedly over the last decade is the separation
of American leadership from the military. For much of the Cold
War period, the leaders of American government were military vet-
erans. Whether their service was at the highest levels (Dwight Ei-
senhower, George Marshall, Al Haig), small unit command or staff
service (Harry Truman, Richard Nixon, John Kennedy), or enlisted
service (any number of influential Congressmen), these Americans
provided a bridge between civilian and military leadership.
Today, that bridge is disappearing. In another decade the senior
public official with military experience will be a rarity. We wil first
examine the present status and evident trends in military service by
high government officials. We raise the question of whether veteran
status makes a difference in the decisions of government. We will
suggest some of the causes of the decline in veterans' presence. The
final part of the Essay will examine the implications of the change
for American civil-military relations and the constitutional govern-
ance of the armed forces.
II. TRENDS IN MILITARY SERVICE AMONG MEMBERS
OF CONGRESS
To assess military representation in Congress,' we reviewed the
membership of the 102nd, 103rd, 104th, and 105th Congresses.2
Within the span of four Congresses, veteran participation dropped
1. This Essay does not address military representation in the executive branch.
John Wheeler, who has studied the decline in veterans' presence in the Clinton exec-
utive branch, notes the sharp decline of high executive branch officials with military
experience from the Bush to the Clinton White House. In December 1992, 30% of
males who were Senate confirmed executive branch appointees were veterans. In
June 1994, the percentage had fallen to 21%. Even more startling was the decline in
male veterans in the Executive Office of the President. In December 1992, 36% of
the males in the Bush White House were veterans. In June 1994, only 4% of the
males in the Clinton White House had seen military service. Fax letter from John
Wheeler to Donald Zillman (Feb. 4, 1995) (on file with Author).
2. All information was drawn from the Congressional Staff Directory biographies
of senators and representatives. Entries allowed a statement of military experience
that typically included dates of service, branch and rank, combat experience, and
military decorations. It is possible that some legislators either embellished or under-
stated their military records. The biographies are not always precise about rank or
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from fifty to thirty-three percent. The decline continued even from
the 103rd (forty-two percent veterans) to the 104th (thirty-eight per-
cent veterans) Congress, a transition that otherwise marked the shift
from Democratic to Republican control and a perceived greater
pro-military posture in Congress.
Tables 1 and 2 identify the number of veterans according to house
of Congress. Table 3 combines the reports from the two houses. Ta-
bles 1 and 2 emphasize that the likelihood of military service varies
by age. Every member of the three Congresses (ranging in age from
the early thirties to the nineties) could plausibly have served in the
armed services for some time in his or her life. The oldest members
could have served during the near-total mobilization of World War
II. All others could have served during the early Cold War and Ko-
rean mobilization, the Vietnam era, or in the post-Vietnam volun-
tary force era.
Legislators were classified by birth date. A birth date between
1903 and 1927 placed the legislator in the World War II era. A birth
date between 1928 and 1938 placed the legislator in the Korea-Cold
War era. A birth date between 1939 and 1955 identified a Vietnam
era legislator. Finally, birth after 1955 placed the legislator in the
"volunteer" era.
The numbers show the present, and likely indicate the future, de-
cline in military service for legislators. Veteran status appeared vir-
tually a requisite for men of the World War II era. About half of the
Korean-Cold War group were veterans. Military service (even in
the National Guard or military reserves) is a rarity among the Viet-
nam era legislators. Military service is almost non-existent for the
legislator who came of age in the "volunteer" era starting in 1973. If
present trends continue, the Congress of the twenty-first century
may be largely without a veteran presence.
For historical contrast we examined the membership of the 91st
Congress which served during the height of the Vietnam War in
1969-70. In that Congress sixty-nine percent of the senators and
seventy-one percent of the representatives had seen military
service.3
We undertook some further examination of members of the 103rd
Congress (many of whose members also served in the 102nd, 104th,
branch of service. Some biographies record both enlisted and officer service for the
same legislator.
The statistical information regarding congressional military representation con-
tained in this Article reflects the Author's own compilation and analysis of the biog-
raphies in the Congressional Staff Directory.
3. Morris Janowitz reports that in the 86th Congress 62.2% of the senators and
59.9% of the House members were veterans. MORRIS JANowrrz, THE PROFES-
SIONAL SOLDmR 358 (1960). The vast majority were former enlistees or junior of-
ficers. See id.
[Vol. 49:85
MILITARY VETERANS IN GOVERNMENT
TABLE 1
MILITARY SERVICE OF SENATORS By AGE
Birth Date
World War II Era
(1903-27)
Korean-Cold War Era
(1928-38)
Vietnam Era
(1939-55)
Volunteer Era
(1956- )
TOTALS
Birth Date
World War II Era
(1903-27)
Korean-Cold War Era
(1928-38)
Vietnam Era
(1939-55)
Volunteer Era
(1956- )
TOTALS
102nd Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
25(93%) 2( 7%)
24 ( 60%) 16 (40%)
18 ( 55%) 15 (45%)
0 0
67 (67%) 33 (33%)
104th Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
19(95%) 1( 5%)
18 (53%) 16 (47%)
15 (33%) 30 ( 67%)
1(100%)
52(52%) 48(48%)
103rd Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
21 91%) 2 ( 9%)
21 53%) 19( 47%)
15 (41%) 22( 59%)
0 0
57 (57%) 43 ( 43%)
105th Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
14 ( 93%) 1 ( 7%)
15 (44%) 19 (56%)
17 ( 35%) 32 (65%)
0 2 (100%)
46 ( 46%) 54 ( 54%)
and 105th Congresses). The results sharpen our understanding of
the meaning and consequences of military service.
Few legislators could be described as professional soldiers. Only
seven legislators were graduates of military colleges. West Point and
Annapolis each contributed two graduates, as did the Citadel. One
VMI graduate was in the Congress.
Only four members (including Senators Glenn and McCain) spent
a career in the military before moving to civilian politics. The other
veterans were almost all enlistees, draftees, or officers (many doubt-
less draft motivated) who served for less than five years on active
duty and predictably rarely rose above the command of a small unit.
Combat heroism is still an attractive political credential. Twenty-
one of the legislators of all generations indicated they received ma-
jor combat decorations (Congressional Medal of Honor, Silver Star,
Bronze Star, Distinguished Flying Cross, Purple Heart). A dispro-
portionate number (nine of twenty-one) were senators (Dole, Hef-
lin, Inouye, John Kerry, Robert Kerrey, McCain, Robb, Roth, and
Thurmond). Ex-astronaut and combat pilot John Glenn could cer-
tainly be added to the senatorial list of those with the military "right
stuff."
No woman in either the Senate or House in any Congress served
in the military. This is not surprising for older female members of
1997]
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TABLE 2
MILITARY SERVICE OF REPRESENTATIVES BY AGE
Birth Date
World War II Era
(1903-27)
Korean-Cold War Era
(1928-38)
Vietnam Era
(1939-55)
Volunteer Era
(1956-)
TOTALS
Birth Date
World War II Era
(1903-27)
Korean-Cold War Era
(1928-38)
Vietnam Era
(1939-55)
Volunteer Era
(1956- )
TOTALS
102nd Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
60 (81%) 14 (19%)
82 ( 59%) 57 (41%)
60 ( 28%) 156 (72%)
103rd Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
38 (86%) 6 (14%)
70 ( 57%) 52 (43%)
58 ( 23%) 189 (77%)
6 (100%) 1 ( 5%) 21 ( 95%)
202 ( 46%) 233 ( 54%)
104th Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
24 ( 86%) 4 (14%)
64(58%) 46(42%)
60( 24%) 193( 76%)
4( 9%) 40(91%)
152 (35%) 283 (65%)
167 ( 38%) 268 ( 62%)
105th Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran
17 ( 85%) 3 (15%)
49 (52%) 46 (48%)
57( 21%) 209( 79%)
3( 6%) 51(94%)
126 ( 29%) 309 ( 71%)
TABLE 3
MILITARY SERVICE OF CONGRESS
102nd Congress 103rd Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran Veteran Non-Veteran
269 ( 50%) 266 ( 50%) 224 ( 42%) 311 (58%)
104th Congress 105th Congress
Veteran Non-Veteran Veteran Non-Veteran
204 ( 38%) 331 ( 62%) 172 ( 32%) 363 ( 68%)
Congress. However, in recent decades as women approach compris-
ing twelve percent of the armed forces, 4 when service academies
produce outstanding women graduates, and when women's roles in
the service are far more visible than in earlier years, it is surprising
that no state or district has elected a woman whose rdsum6 offered a
period of military service. Nevertheless, it is clear that part of the
reason for the decline in military representation in Congress from
1969-70 to 1993-94 is gender based; as women continue to comprise
4. See CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, 1995 CDI MILITARY ALMANAC 12
(1995).
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an increasing proportion of Congress, we have witnessed a corre-
sponding decrease in its military representation.
The trend in military experience in Congress is shown in the mem-
bership of the Class of 1992-those legislators elected to a first term
in Congress in November 1992. Twelve senators and 104 represent-
atives joined the Congress upon election in 1992 or by mid-term ap-
pointment. Nine of the new senators had no military experience.
Ninety of the 104 new representatives (eighty-six percent) had no
military service.
For the freshman of the Class of 1994, the numbers were similar in
the Senate, but more favorable to veterans in the House. Of twelve
new senators, two were veterans. Of eighty-five new representa-
tives, twenty-two were veterans. In the 1996 election, six of fifteen
new senators were veterans. Fourteen of seventy-three new repre-
sentatives were veterans.
Military service was only slightly more common among senators
and representatives from the South than among those from the rest
of the country. In 1992, of the four senators elected from former
Confederate states, two had military service. Of thirty-four new
representatives, only five had served. In 1996, two of four new sena-
tors and eight of twenty-four new House members were veterans.
More veterans were Republicans than Democrats. However, the
numbers do not appear out of proportion with GOP majorities in
both houses of Congress. After the 1996 election, twenty-six of the
forty-six veteran senators were Republicans. In the House, there
were seventy-three GOP veterans and fifty-three Democratic veter-
ans. The veteran members of the Vietnam era (birth dates 1939-55)
were slightly more likely to be Democrats than Republicans. Dem-
ocratic veterans of this era include nine senators and thirty repre-
sentatives in contrast to seven senators and thirty-three
representatives for the majority party Republicans.
The most intriguing group to compare for partisan purposes are
the "volunteer" era legislators (birth dates after 1955). This is the
only generation whose members had to consciously select military
service. Almost none did. But all three veterans of the volunteer
era are Republicans. Obviously, no conclusions can be drawn from
such fragmentary evidence. However, the matter bears watching in
future Congresses. The disappearance of a veteran presence in Con-
gress is troubling for reasons to be discussed. It would be even more
troubling if that limited presence represents one political party
disproportionately.
The wave of the future is clearly indicated in a comparison of the
World War H class with the volunteer era class. Each World War II
veteran will have turned seventy by the end of 1997. The full retire-
ment of the class will remove thirty veterans (including thirteen sen-
1997]
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ators) from Congress. By contrast, the fifty-six members of the
volunteer era class include only three veterans.
The figures for the Freshman Class of 1992 were particularly sig-
nificant given the recency of Operation Desert Storm-the United
States' most successful military action since the Second World War.
Only two new legislators of 116 elected served in the campaign.
This is true despite an average age of the Desert Storm force that
exceeded the minimum age for election to Congress and despite a
substantial reserve presence in the force.
III. THE RELEVANCE OF VETERAN STATUS TO LEGISLATIVE
DECISIONMAKING: Two CASE STUDIES
What is the impact of veteran legislators on particular legisla-
tion?5 Two issues that faced the 102nd and 103rd Congresses pro-
vide case studies of the relevance of military service to defense
issues. The first is the "vote to go to war" in the Persian Gulf Crisis
of 1991. The second is the vote to write into statute the virtual ban
on homosexual service in the military enacted as part of the Defense
Authorization Act of 1993.6 Both issues were visible and conten-
tious. Legislators' votes and discussion were likely the product of
considerable deliberation after much lobbying from interest groups,
individual constituents, and fellow legislators.
In both cases, we examined the debate in the Congressional Rec-
ord for evidence that the legislators' military experience helped
structure their views or influenced their votes. We then classified
the actual votes according to military experience.
A. The Persian Gulf Crisis
On January 14, 1991, Congress approved the Authorization for
Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution.7 The authorization
gave approval for President Bush's use of armed forces to enforce
United Nations resolutions seeking to reverse Iraq's seizure of Ku-
wait in August 1990.
The congressional debate had been preceded by ample national
debate about the success of sanctions and the necessity of congres-
sional approval of war, whether by a formal declaration or its func-
tional equivalent. During the time Congress debated from January
10-12, its decision was pressured by a January 15 United Nations'
deadline for Iraqi compliance with its resolutions.
5. For a review of the scholarship on this question, see Roger Little, Senate Mili-
tary Veterans Voting on Defense Issues, 1983-90 (Oct. 23, 1993) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with Author). Little's cautious conclusion is that the veteran may be
more likely to support a pro-defense position than the non-veteran. See id. at 14-16.
6. 10 U.S.C.A. § 654 (West Supp. 1997).
7. Pub. L. No. 102-1, 105 Stat. 1991.
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The legislative debate gave exhaustive consideration to two is-
sues-continued economic sanctions versus military response, and
congressional versus presidential war power. Most legislators af-
firmed the right of Congress to make the decision for war. Few
ruled out military action. The crucial question was: "When?" A
sharp division arose between those favoring more time for sanctions
to work and opposing present use of military force, and those favor-
ing granting the authority to the President to begin combat activity
on January 15 if Iraqi resistance to the United Nations resolutions
continued.
The Senate, after voting down a proposal to continue sanctions
only, voted fifty-two to forty-seven to approve the use of force.8
Prior military service did not seem to determine senators' votes. Of
those members of the 102nd Congress present for the vote, the sup-
porters of the immediate use of force included nineteen senators
with no military experience and thirty-three senators with military
experience. Senators voting against the immediate use of force in-
cluded fourteen with no military service and thirty-three veterans.
In the House, the resolution for immediate use of force was
adopted by a vote of 250 to 183.9 The Yes voters in the 102nd Con-
gress included 129 non-veterans and 127 veterans. The No voters
included 112 non-veterans and seventy-one veterans. Here, military
service seemed relevant to the votes. If only the veterans had voted,
the vote would have been nearly two to one for war. If only non-
veterans had voted, the decision for war would have passed by a
bare majority.
The floor debate adds perspective on the relevance of military
service. Senator Cohen, a non-veteran, noted "the presence of so
many of our colleagues who have been touched by the winds of war
in a personal or in a very violent way .... ."1 He continued: "What
is striking about this is how [the veterans] see the need for pressure
or patience in the Persian Gulf in such a different way."'I
On some issues there was general agreement. Nearly all of the
veterans spoke of the horrors of war as they had observed it. They
usually prefaced their remarks by reference to their military service,
but their sacrifice and heroism were usually understated. Senator
Bentsen: "I never saw people in combat that were not uptight,
sweating, and worried. If they were not, they were either without
imagination or they were dumb."12 Senator Glenn: "The glorious
wars of the history books cannot erase the horrors of war up close
8. See 137 CONG. REC. S403 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991).
9. See i. at H485.
10. Id at 5334 (statement of Sen. Cohen).
11. It
12. Id at S223 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Bentsen).
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and personal.... I have experienced war and combat."' 3 And most
vividly, Representative Bennett:
When I first came to Congress, I wore a ribbon, the Silver
Star. I did it partly as an apology for being crippled.... I was
given that, with a citation that said "Gallantry in Action."
Friends, there is no such thing as gallantry in action. I do
not want to run down anybody else's award, but action, mili-
tary action, is a horrible experience. There is no gallantry in
it.14
Similarly, many members seemed troubled that this was a war
that few of them would experience first hand. No member declared
himself ready to enlist, in contrast to numerous such declarations in
World War II. Further, only a small handful had children in the
combat zone or even in the armed services.
As a reaction to this, members seemed eager to find a personal
connection to the decision to use force. References were made to
nephews, brothers, and fathers-in-law either in the combat zone or
facing deployment there. 5 Other legislators spoke speculatively of
their civilian children being deployed. 16 They also spoke of their
actual experience on Selective Service Boards during Vietnam,' 7 of
their congressional district suffering disproportionate losses in Viet-
nam,' 8 of having lost children to illness,19 and of having been raised
in the funeral home business.2" The objective was to persuade the
country that this was a shared sacrifice. The reality was that most
members could make no claim to combat service, and no claim that
their children and grandchildren would one day be doing the
fighting.
Two lessons of war from Korea and Vietnam were raised by both
veterans and non-veterans. The first was that half-hearted engage-
ment was a mistake. Senator McCain: "If we must use force, we
must use it quickly and decisively."'" Representative Blaz: "In Ko-
13. Id at 5241 (statement of Sen. Glenn).
14. Id at H390 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Bennett).
15. See id at H168 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991) (statement of Rep. Weldon) (referring
to his nephews); id- at H171 (statement of Rep. Hayes) (referring to his nephews);
id. at H217 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1991) (statement of Rep. Vucanovich) (referring to his
father and brother); id. at H324 (statement of Rep. Franks) (referring to his nephew
and brother); id. at H361 (statement of Rep. Doman) (referring to his nephew); Id.
at H375 (statement of Rep. Wheat) (referring to his father); id. at S282 (statement of
Sen. Gorton) (referring to his son-in-law); id at S364 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (state-
ment of Sen. Coats) (referring to daughter's fiancd).
16. See id at S215 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. Riegle); Id. at S245
(statement of Sen. Lautenberg); id. at S288 (statement of Sen. Murkowski).
17. See id at H181 (daily ed. Jan. 10, 1991) (statement of Rep. Kanjorski).
18. See id. at H353 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1991) (statement of Rep. Manton).
19. See id. at H416 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Roukema).
20. See id. at H428 (statement of Rep. Espy).
21. Id. at S230 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1991) (statement of Sen. McCain).
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rea we failed. We ended with a draw. I was there. I could not be-
lieve that I always had to seek permission to turn right or turn
left." The second related point was that war should only be fought
with the full support of the country. Senator Kerry found war justi-
fiable only "when the Nation as a whole has decided that there is a
real threat. .... There is no consensus in America for war .... ,23
Representative Peterson, a Vietnam POW: "I vowed when I sat in
Hanoi that I would never allow anyone to persuade me to send
troops into battle without the backing of the American people
"24
Military experience should have been useful in answering the
most relevant questions of early January 1991: (1) What would be
the likely result of an immediate resort to force? (2) What would be
the consequences to coalition military readiness of a delay of an-
other six months to a year to allow economic sanctions to work?
In hindsight, the most useful information that a legislator could
have had on January 12 was that the War could be brought to a
successful conclusion within two months and with an American bat-
tlefield fatality rate of 148. All legislators expressed confidence in
eventual coalition success. No one wanted to appear to be bluffed
down by Saddam Hussein. But projections varied widely as to the
intensity of the combat and the degree of eventual success. Senator
Wellstone, a non-veteran and opponent of the war, spoke of a
"nightmare in the Persian Gulf . . . [that will tear] the country
apart." Senator Dixon, a combat veteran who supported the con-
tinued use of sanctions rather than war, urged President Bush to
avoid ground conflict and attempt to win from the air alone if war
were nevertheless declared. He spoke of the Iraqi Republican
Guard as "excellent soldiers and battle-hardened people who fought
for 9 years in that region." 27 Senator Robb, a combat veteran and
supporter of the war, also sought to avoid ground confrontation
"where our losses could quickly become unacceptable under almost
any definition."'
Veterans were able to offer useful cautions on the dangers of wait-
ing for sanctions to work. Representative Murtha, a decorated
Marine veteran of Vietnam, spoke of the harsh Middle Eastern envi-
ronment and the danger of sustaining a force for too long. "You put
your hand on metal and you get a third-degree bum. It is so hot
they have to train at nighttime and sleep in the daytime."2 9 Combat
22. Id. at H394 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Blaz).
23. Id. at S396 (daily ed. Jan. 13, 1991) (statement of Sen. Kerry).
24. Id. at H421 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Rep. Peterson).
25. See THE WoRw AtANAC AND BOOK OF FACTS 184 (1997).
26. 137 CONG. REC. S396 (daily ed. Jan. 12, 1991) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
27. Id at S373 (statement of Sen. Dixon).
28. Id. at S378 (statement of Sen. Robb).
29. Id. at H407 (statement of Rep. Murtha).
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veteran Representative Montgomery emphasized that a rotation of
troops would weaken our combat force, which he felt had just
reached peak efficiency."
Many legislators emphasized that they recognized their words
were being heard by our troops, by Saddam Hussein, and by the
American public, as well as their fellow legislators. That fact obvi-
ously discouraged some comments on the floor that might have
been expressed privately to colleagues.
Nonetheless, the veterans' input to the Gulf War discussion
seemed of limited value. Comments on the horrors of war were pre-
dictable in the wake of Vietnam. Comments on the consequences of
a delay for sanctions to work were of greater use. Maintaining a
force of half a million troops in a hostile environment for an indefi-
nite period is not a costless exercise. On this point veterans, particu-
larly combat veterans, had useful comments to offer both as to
matters of supply and troop rotation and as to the impact on morale
of individual soldiers forced to maintain combat readiness for an
indefinite period of time in the face of what would probably be a
diminishing national support for the mission. Most crucial, how-
ever, would have been a veteran consensus on the likely results of
combat. With the benefit of hindsight, historians will probably re-
gard the Gulf War results as utterly predictable given a satisfactory
fighting spirit among the coalition forces. Yet, few legislators were
ready to offer that scenario to their colleagues. Veterans, particu-
larly officers familiar with air-land battle concepts, could have as-
serted their expertise as to "what would happen." The decision as to
"whether it should happen" could then be left to the non-military
factors that might have influenced an individual legislator's vote.
B. Statutory Restrictions on Gays in the Military
The "gays in the military" controversy will probably become a
case study of poor military-civilian and legislative-executive rela-
tions. President-elect Clinton's promises of support for gay and les-
bian rights inspired a January 1993 presidential promise to end
discrimination against gays and lesbians in the military. Immediate
legislative and military opposition surfaced. The opposition re-
flected both the merits of gays in service and the degree of defer-
ence that a new and non-veteran president should give to the
leadership of the armed forces.
A face-saving compromise put the issue out for study for six
months. During that time the military leadership and the President
reached a compromise that slightly improved the position of gays in
the military.
30. See id at H451 (statement of Rep. Montgomery).
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However, some legislators were not satisfied. They sought to
write the policy concerning homosexuals in the military into statute
rather than leaving it the subject of presidential order. The pro-
posed statute was as anti-gay as the pre-Clinton policy. The legisla-
tion asserted that homosexuality is incompatible with military
service and that the issue was one on which Congress should speak
as the final authority.3' The statute was proposed as part of the
1993 Defense Authorization Act.
Opponents of either the anti-gay policy or the attempt to set pol-
icy by statute sought an amendment that would leave the policy on
gays in service to be set by the President and the armed forces. In
effect, they sought to save the compromise reached between the
President and the armed forces between January and July of 1993.
The form of the amendment also removed the need for a Yes or No
vote on a politically volatile issue: "Are gays entitled to serve in the
armed forces?"
The debate in both houses, however, centered on the proper mili-
tary policy towards homosexuals. Most legislators who spoke
seemed comfortable talking about the issue rather than only talking
about whether the President or Congress should set personnel quali-
fication standards.
There was some common ground. Virtually all legislators con-
tended that Congress, in its role of setting policy for the military,
had full power to set performance and conduct standards to pre-
serve military efficiency and morale. Virtually all legislators claimed
they did not want to stigmatize homosexuals or to encourage dis-
crimination against them.
Beyond that, however, there was a sharp divide. Supporters of
the "leave it to the President" amendment argued: (1) Gays have in
fact served capably, often heroically, throughout history in the
United States' military and other armed forces. (2) Conduct, not
status, should be the key factor in judging military service. Hetero-
sexual misconduct, notably the recent Tailhook scandal, could pose
just as serious a harm to military discipline and morale as homosex-
ual misconduct. Both should be controlled. (3) At bottom, argu-
ments against gay service were no different from those heard in
other times against service by racial minorities or women. (4) A
Rand Corporation study and other studies indicated that integration
by sexual orientation would do no harm to the military; other armed
forces and police departments have accepted gays.32
Opponents of the "leave it to the President" amendment (who
were almost always supporters of the final statutory gay ban) ap-
proached the issue as a matter of military policy, not discrimination.
They argued: (1) Our primary responsibility is to provide for an
31. See 10 U.S.C. § 654(a) (1994).
32. See 139 CONG. REc. H7069 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (discussing Rand study).
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armed force whose training, discipline, and supply wins wars. Other
factors are secondary. (2) The acceptance of homosexuals in other
parts of society should not control military policy because of the in-
timate and extensive demands of military life. (3) The military lead-
ership and the military ranks were substantially opposed to the
addition of known homosexuals to the ranks.
What impact did veteran status have on the debate and the vote?
Both the House and the Senate rejected the "leave it to the Presi-
dent" amendment by considerable majorities. The amendment
failed in the Senate by thirty-three to sixty-three;33 in the House by
169 to 264. 4 Similar or larger margins supported the approval of
the statutory anti-gay policy and the eventual passage of the entire
Defense Authorization Act.
In the Senate, military service did not appear to predict a pro or
anti-gay position. Nineteen veterans joined fourteen non-veterans
in voting Yes on the "leave it to the President" amendment. The
nineteen veterans included four combat heroes-Inouye, Kerrey,
Kerry, and Robb. They were defeated by a coalition of thirty-seven
veterans and twenty-six non-veterans. Five veterans with combat
heroism-Heffin, McCain, Roth, Dole, and Thurmond-were
among the thirty-seven.
In the House, military service was more predictive of attitudes on
gay service. Supporters of the "leave it to the President" position
included 117 non-veterans and forty-five veterans (including five
combat heroes). Opponents included 139 non-veterans and 123 vet-
erans (including seven combat heroes). If only non-veterans had
voted, the anti-gay position would have won, but by a fairly close
margin. Had the issue been left only to veterans, a nearly three-to-
one vote would have opposed gay service.
Military service seemed less predictive of the vote than two other
factors. Women legislators (all non-veterans) would have approved
the "leave it to the President" amendment by a vote of thirty-two to
eighteen. Southerners (representing one of the old Confederate
states) opposed the "leave it to the President" amendment by an
overwhelming 117 to twenty-six.
The floor debate provided very little useful comment by veterans
that was drawn from their military experience. Unlike the Gulf War
debate, no security or foreign policy concerns restrained speech.
Opponents of military service for gays were willing to mention
their military record and to suggest that non-veterans in Congress
and elsewhere did not understand the issue. Representative Cun-
ningham: "Those Members that supported the total lifting of the
ban on homosexuals, that have never fired a shot in anger, that have
33. See id. S11228 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993).
34. See idl at H7083 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1993).
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never been in combat. I would ask them to stick to the areas that
they are knowledgeable about."3 Senator Coats: "The President's
policy of homosexuals in the military would have undermined mo-
rale and prevented commanders from dealing with problems in their
units."'36 Representative Dornan:
We have had a long string of people, with no military experi-
ence whatsoever... comment on this issue today. To have
this House lectured about well-behaved homosexuals, by some
Members with, shall we say, behavioral problems of their own
is too much.... In my military experience, I served on active
duty at 10 bases across the country. On eight of those bases
there were instances of homosexual activity, each with dishon-
orable conduct and dishonorable discharges.37
Supporters of military service for gays were similarly unhelpful.
Congressman Dellums spoke of the "cruel myth" that gays destroy
unit morale. He observed: "All my experiences-as a marine...
lead me to believe that we could [allow full service by gays]."'
The lack of military expertise in the debate is disappointing. Un-
like the Gulf War debate (where former generals would have a bet-
ter sense of crucial military issues than captains, sergeants, or
privates), key evidence in the "gays in the military" debate could
have been provided by experienced junior officers and enlisted peo-
ple. Were gays in fact prevalent, albeit undercover, in the forces?
Was the gay presence disruptive of the military mission? What de-
grees of tolerance of gays in the service exist? Accepting discrete
off-base homosexual relations is one thing; having mandatory sensi-
tivity training to appreciate the gay lifestyle is another. Little in the
actual floor debate provided helpful guidance to the legislator seek-
ing to balance an opposition to discrimination against gays and a
fear of actual harm to the functioning of the armed forces.
IV. VETERAN STATUS AMONG MEMBERS OF THE
FEDERAL JUDICIARY
The United States Supreme Court has recognized that "judges are
not given the task of running the Army."39 However, that observa-
tion was made in a case in which the Court had the ability to review
a military personnel action. The Supreme Court regularly stands as
reviewer of last resort for a variety of military personnel issues. Ju-
dicial standards govern or strongly influence the laws administered
by the military (for example, military criminal procedure standards).
35. 139 CONG. REC. H6071 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1993) (statement of Rep.
Cunningham).
36. 139 CONG. REc. Sl1158 (daily ed. Sept. 9, 1993) (statement of Sen. Coats).
37. Id. at H7070 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1993) (statement of Rep. Dornan).
38. Id. at H7066 (statement of Rep. Dellums).
39. Orloff v. Willoughby, 345 U.S. 83, 93 (1953).
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Finally, issues of large consequence for the military may be decided
by the United States Supreme Court. Both of the legislative issues
discussed in Part III illustrate the point. One lower federal court
decision helped shape the question of Congress's power to limit the
president's commitment of troops to combat at the time Congress
approved the Iraqi use of force resolution. 40 The congressional ap-
proval mooted the issue of congressional versus presidential power.
A contrary vote by Congress (and recall the Senate margin of fifty-
two to forty-seven) might have forced a landmark Supreme Court
decision. Likewise, the ultimate resolution of the "gays in the mili-
tary" issue may turn on a ruling from the Supreme Court.
We examined the status of veterans in the present federal judici-
ary.41 Table 4 shows the results. The judiciary has a slightly greater
veterans' presence than the Congress. Otherwise, it shows the same
pattern as Congress. Veteran status is virtually a requisite for the
World War II cohort; more likely than not for the Korea-Cold War
vets; and unusual for the Vietnam cohort.
TABLE 4
MILITARY SERVICE BY FEDERAL JUDGES BY AGE
District Court Court of Appeals
Birth Date Veteran Non-Veteran Veteran Non-Veteran
World War II Era 39 (85%) 7 (15%) 14 (67%) 7 (33%)
(1903-27)
Korean Cold War Era 146 (61%) 93 (39%) 40 (53%) 35 (47%)
(1928-38)
Vietnam Era 79 (28%) 204 (72%) 13 (20%) 52 (80%)
(1956-)
TOTALS 264 (47%) 304 (53%) 67 (42%) 94 (58%)
Total District and Circuit Judges: Veteran 45% Non-Veterans 55%
It is also not surprising that the most law-oriented of the three
branches of government draws a percentage of its members from
judge advocate service, the military legal branches. Of 331 district
or circuit judges with military experience, we found thirty-three with
40. See Dellums v. Bush, 752 F. Supp. 1141 (D.D.C. 1990). John Hart Ely, how-
ever, reports:
At a joint Georgetown/Center for National Security Studies conference on
September 19, 1992, Nicholas Rostow, General Counsel for the National
Security Council, indicated that there was a "100% certainty" that Bush
would have invaded even had Congress voted the Desert Storm Resolution
down. Let us pray this was hyperbole.
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY 174 (1993).
41. Statistics for military experience in the federal judiciary were compiled using
THE AMERICAN BENCH: JUDGES OF THE NATION (Marie T. Finn ed., 8th ed. 1995-
96) and the American Federal Judiciary database in WESTLAW.
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some judge advocate service. Officers with only judge advocate ser-
vice (and many judge advocates over the years have been commis-
sioned as officers directly out of law school) may well have
experienced a rather unique slice of the military-a professional
staff position with limited exposure to the fighting forces.
The veteran's credential does appear more frequently among
judges from the South than among those from the country as a
whole. In the Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits veterans outnum-
ber non-veterans by ninety-five to eighty-four. Even in the Vietnam
generation the non-veterans outnumber the veterans by only sixty-
three to forty-three. In the Eleventh Circuit the majority of judges
in the Vietnam generation are veterans.
V. THE IMPORTANCE OF VETERAN STATUS AMONG HIGH
GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS
Should we be concerned about the military experience of our high
government officials? We spend little time worrying whether
elected officials individually or collectively have served in the Bu-
reau of Land Management, the Department of Health and Human
Services, or the Postal Service. However, a variety of factors make
the issue of officials' military service relevant:
(1) Like it or not, the military still embodies national virtues in
ways that other government service does not. The combat hero, the
stoic prisoner of war, or even the desk-bound military short-timer
promises to bring such virtues as courage, fortitude, selflessness, or
respect for discipline to his or her new position in government.
(2) Military service remains the significant "school of the nation."
Neither law practice, work in the civilian government bureaucracy,
nor experience as a business owner is as likely to expose the elected
official to the contact with men (and increasingly women) from all
races, religions, social classes, and geographic locations. No other
profession has a dedication to national service above self as its pri-
mary ethic. People from such a background may be useful in the
national government.
(3) In the rare cases where civilian leadership follows high-level
military leadership, the ex-officer has genuine expertise on military
matters. High-level experience in foreign relations is also likely to
be present. An Eisenhower, MacArthur, Haig, Schwartzkopf,
Crowe, or Powell would know the military better than any civilian
leader could. Such military leaders could also begin handling so-
phisticated foreign relations issues (often with intimate acquain-
tance with major foreign leaders) on the first day of their civilian
service.
(4) The more typical military veteran, the short-term officer or
enlisted person, brings a perspective on military matters not open to
a public official who has never served. Parts of the military experi-
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ence are shared by all those who have served but are difficult to
explain to those who have not. Some of this has shown up in the
debate over gays in the military. Even the most learned academic
without military experience lacked credibility when theorizing on
unit cohesion or threats to discipline or the burdens of confined
living.
The Gulf War and gays-in-the-military votes demonstrate that
veteran status does not predict votes. The veteran may side with the
military position. But the veteran may offer the needed perspective
to an excessively optimistic Pentagon prediction. Comments of vet-
eran legislators in the Desert Storm debate were useful reminders
that what may appear foolproof and antiseptic on the general's
briefing chart is rarely so to the troops in the field.
(5) Prior military experience may help justify a federal elected
official's decision to commit American forces to combat-probably
the most solemn decision our elected officials can make. As the
Gulf War debate showed, legislators and presidents referred to their
military service in the course of debate. They sought to evoke a
shared sacrifice. Also, a John Kerry, Bob Dole, or George Bush can
bring a moral authority to talk of life's unfairness or the enormity of
the decision to commit American lives to combat that a Bill Clinton,
Newt Gingrich, or Pat Buchanan cannot.
VI. THE IMPLICATIONS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF
THE MILITARY
These concerns about the military service of high government of-
ficials are a part of the continuing evolution of American civil-mili-
tary relations or the more ominous sounding "civilian control of the
military." The earlier sections of this Essay indicate that the
America of the twenty-first century will wield enormous military
power and it will be wielded by government officers with very little
direct exposure to the armed services.
The drafters of the Constitution gave ample attention to military
issues. Only a decade earlier the signers of the Declaration of Inde-
pendence had excoriated King George III for keeping "among us, in
times of peace, Standing Armies without the Consent of our legisla-
ture," and for rendering "the Military independent of and superior
to the Civil power."'42
Although the terms "civilian control" and "civil-military rela-
tions" do not appear in the Constitution, the framers were keenly
alert to the concepts.
The Constitution establishes civilian control over the uniformed
military and divides civilian authority among the branches of gov-
ernment. The president is commander in chief. By his veto power
42. TiiE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 1 (U.S. 1776).
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and the power to "recommend [to Congress] such Measures as he
shall judge necessary and expedient,"43 the president plays a role in
the legislative process.
Congress has the power to declare war, to raise and support ar-
mies, to provide and maintain a navy, and to make rules for the land
and naval forces, and has certain powers to govern and use the mili-
tia (state military forces).
The Supreme Court and lower federal courts have judicial power
over all cases arising under the Constitution and laws of the United
States. This includes the interpretation of the military powers
granted to the president and Congress, and interpretation of provi-
sions of the Bill of Rights protecting individuals against governmen-
tal powers.
The Constitution imposes no requirement, preference, or prohibi-
tion for prior military service by either elected or appointed federal
officials. Additional government service by present military person-
nel is addressed in the "Incompatibility Clause" of Article I, Section
6, discussed later. By implication, the Constitution forbids further
statutory or regulatory qualifications for the president or members
of Congress than those imposed by the Constitution. The existing
qualifications relate solely to age, place of birth, and residence.
The drafters of the Constitution expressed no view of their atti-
tude toward military veterans in positions of governmental leader-
ship. However, a significant number of the drafters had seen
military service in the Revolution or earlier wars. Those who had
not fought were usually closely involved with military issues in their
work in the states and the Continental Congress. Further, their mili-
tary experience (whether in uniform or civilian leadership) had been
close to home. Few counties in the colonies had been more than a
day's march from some military activity during the six years of war
from Lexington to Yorktown. Lastly, most participants in the Con-
stitutional Convention assumed George Washington, the new na-
tion's preeminent veteran, would be the first president.
The Fhst Congress, which convened in March 1789, reflected the
Revolutionary War experience of America's leadership. Half of the
twenty-six senators and forty-one of sixty-seven House members
had military experience of one kind or another.n The new com-
mander in chief was America's most celebrated soldier. When this
Congress adopted the Bill of Rights, it excluded the military from
the application of the grand jury provision of the Fifth Amend-
ment.45 It also rejected proposed amendments that condemned
43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
44. Biographical information is drawn from BIOGRAPHcAL DIRECTORY OF THE
UNrrED STATES CONGRESS: 1774-1989 (Kathryn Allamong Jacob & Bruce A. Rag-
sdale eds., 1989).
45. See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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standing armies and required the subordination of the military to
the civilian power.' The initial Congresses also adopted the laws
that would create a permanent federal military and naval
establishment.47
The constitutional provision most directly addressing the military
status of federal officials is the "dual office" or "incompatibility"
provision applicable to legislators. The provision of Article I, Sec-
tion 6 provides "no Person holding any Office under the United
States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in
Office." 48
During the Vietnam War, opponents of the war brought suit
against members of Congress to prevent them from holding military
reserve commissions.49 The evidence showed that over 100 mem-
bers of recent Congresses held some form of reserve commission. 50
The plaintiffs argued that the dual offices placed the legislator-re-
servists in jeopardy of being coerced by the commander in chief (for
example, by a call to active duty or a discharge from the reserves)
and subject to bias in carrying out their duties as legislators.5 ' More
directly, the plaintiffs contended that the legislator-reservists consti-
tuted a substantial part of the support for continuing the Vietnam
War.5 2
Both the trial and appellate courts agreed that the plaintiffs'
claims could be heard by the court.53 On the merits of the case, they
agreed with the plaintiffs.' A reserve commission was held to be a
federal "office."5 5 Accordingly, the Incompatibility Clause made a
member of Congress ineligible to hold a reserve commission.
The United States Supreme Court decided the case as a matter of
standing. The Court ruled that neither as citizens nor as taxpayers
did the plaintiffs have a legal basis to ask the Court to rule on the
incompatibility issue.57 That ruling barred the plaintiffs from court
and ended the case without a Supreme Court ruling interpreting the
46. See 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 780-81 (1790); 1 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE
FIRST FEDERAL CONGRESS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Linda Grant
DePauw ed., 1972).
47. See An Act to Provide a Naval Armament, 1 Stat. 350-51 (1794); An Act
More Effectually to Provide for the National Defense by Establishing a Uniform
Militia Throughout the United States, 1 Stat. 271 (1792).
48. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 6.
49. See Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
50. See id. at 210 n.2.
51. See id. at 212.
52. See id. at 211.
53. See id. at 212-14.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 214.
56. See id.
57. See id. at 222, 228.
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Incompatibility Clause.5" The dissenting opinions of Justices Doug-
las and Marshall suggested that they would have reached the same
conclusions as the lower courts-Congresspersons could not be re-
serve officers. 59
The marked decline in congressional reservists over a quarter-
century substantially mooted the issue. Although the available con-
gressional biographies do not positively identify all present reserve
officers, the number presently appears to be fewer than a dozen.
Could Congress by law require (or forbid) some or all of its mem-
bers from having military experience? Aside from the Incompatibil-
ity Clause discussed but not resolved in Schlesinger, the Constitution
is silent on the issue. However, the Supreme Court in other con-
texts has made clear that Congress lacks power to add to the consti-
tutional qualifications for membership.60
The issue of military experience in the Congress also calls to mind
the Supreme Court's observations in Greer v. Spock.6' The narrow
holding of this 1976 opinion was that the military was entitled to
forbid partisan political campaign activity (specifically, the third-
party presidential campaign of Dr. Benjamin Spock) from a military
installation.62
The Supreme Court sustained the military action on several
grounds. First, it rejected the claim that military installations should
be treated as public fora, like public parks, in which every variety of
First Amendment activity could take place.6 The Court tartly ob-
served: "[I]t is consequently the business of a military installation
like Fort Dix to train soldiers, not to provide a public forum."'
Second, the case recognized the considerable power of the mili-
tary commander over his installation. Citing the earlier case of Caf-
58. See id. at 216.
59. See id. at 232, 235.
60. The pertinent recent case is Representative Adam Clayton Powell's action
against the House of Representatives. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 US. 486
(1969). The House voted to "exclude" Powell from membership based on his alleg-
edly corrupt behavior as a Congressman. See id. at 493. Powell challenged the ex-
clusion as beyond congressional powers. See id. The Supreme Court agreed with
Powell. It held that the action of the House did not fall within Article I, Section 5.
Clause 2 of the Constitution, which gave Congress the power to "expel" members by
a two-thirds vote. See id. at 550. The action of exclusion for conduct in effect added
an additional qualification to those spelled out in the Constitution. The Court ob-
served: "[I]n judging the qualifications of its members Congress is limited to the
standing qualifications prescribed in the Constitution." le. This would strongly sug-
gest that the military experience, if any, of the members of Congress is left to the
electoral choices of the voters in the 50 states. See also United States Term Limits,
Inc. v. Thornton, 115 S. Ct. 1842 (1995).
61. 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
62. See id. at 839.
63. See id. at 836.
64. Ia at 838.
MAINE LAW REVIEW
eteria & Restaurant Union, Local 473 Workers v. McElroy,65 the
Court referred to the "historically unquestioned power of [a] com-
manding officer summarily to exclude civilians from the area of his
command."66
Third, and of most pertinence to our topic, the Court spoke of the
value of:
keeping official military activities.., wholly free of entangle-
ment with partisan political campaigns of any kind.... [T]he
military as such is insulated from both the reality and the ap-
pearance of acting as a handmaiden for partisan political
causes or candidates.
Such a policy is wholly consistent with the American consti-
tutional tradition of a politically neutral military establishment
under civilian control. It is a policy that has been reflected in
numerous laws and military regulations throughout our
history.6
7
Scholars of American civil-military relations have emphasized
that the subject is far more sophisticated than the simple inquiry:
"Has the military avoided seizing power from the civilian authori-
ties?",68 Healthy civil-military relations and a sensible "civilian con-
trol of the military" require mutual respect and understanding
between the civilian leadership and the military. The military must
be respectful of ultimate civilian authority and the non-military fac-
tors that drive national security decisions. The civilian authorities
must be respectful of the military's professionalism and its need for
non-partisanship. The civilian leadership must also give considera-
ble deference to military expertise in military matters. The micro-
managing president or Congress may be a less visible threat than the
overreaching general or admiral. But they both harm the goal of an
effective and professional military under civilian authority.
The United States Supreme Court has maintained that balance in
its military decisions in the half-century since World War II. In
broad outline, two themes have guided the decisions. The first has
been caution over the intrusion of the military (whether acting on its
own or acting under the orders of civilian leadership) into the civil-
ian world. One memorable illustration was the Court's rejection of
President Truman's seizure of the steel industry in order to maintain
Korean wartime production in Youngstown Sheet & Tube v. Saw-
yer.69 To affirm the President's action-which three justices were
65. 367 U.S. 886 (1961).
66. Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. at 838 (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers
Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. at 893).
67. IL at 839.
68. The classic works remain SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE
STATE, THE THEORY AND POLITIcs OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS (1957), and JA.
NOWITZ, supra note 3.
69. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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ready to do0 -would have assuredly given a broad scope to presi-
dential powers as commander in chief in non-military contexts.
A second set of cases involve the rejection of military criminal
jurisdiction over a variety of defendants connected to, but not actu-
ally members of, the military. Justice Black's language in United
States ex reL Toth v. Quarles7  speaks for the entire line of decisions:
"Free countries of the world have tried to restrict military tribunals
to the narrowest jurisdiction deemed absolutely essential to main-
taining discipline among troops in active service."' It should be re-
called that this line of decisions restricting military court-martial
authority overturned an express grant of jurisdiction from Congress.
The second theme apparent in Supreme Court cases recognizes
that within the military realm, the military, as directed by the Con-
gress and the president, has wide discretion in setting standards that
may not accord with civilian constitutional standards. In the realm
of military criminal justice, the Court has recognized that military
status alone is sufficient to authorize court-martial jurisdiction.73
Other cases have upheld criminal statutes that would probably fall
afoul of vagueness standards in civilian criminal jurisprudence7 and
sustained some of the uniquely military aspects of the composition
of court-martial.75 Likewise, the recognition of the military as a
"separate society" has sustained uniform regulations against chal-
lenges that they violate the Free Exercise Clause,76 controls on sol-
dier speech and petition,' and the single sex military draft. A
related line of cases has given the military control over access to
70. See id. at 710 (Vinson, CJ., Reed & Minton, J.J., dissenting).
71. 350 U.S. 11 (1955) (rejecting court-martial jurisdiction over former service-
men for crimes committed while in the military).
72. Id at 22. See Kinsella v. United States ex reL Singleton, 361 U.S. 234 (1960)
(rejecting court-martial jurisdiction over civilian spouse of service member for non-
capital offense); McElroy v. United States ex reL Guagliardo, 361 U.S. 281 (1960)
(rejecting court-martial jurisdiction over civilian employee of overseas military
force).
73. See, eg., Solorio v. United States, 483 U.S. 435, 450-51 (1987) (affirming the
conviction of a serviceman for criminal conduct committed while a member of
Armed Services).
74. See, eg., Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 755-56, 761 (1974) (upholding convic-
tion for violating Articles 90, 133, and 134 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice).
75. See, eg., Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 165 (1994) (holding that the
current method of appointing military judges does not violate the Appointments
Clause and that the lack of a fixed term of office for military judges does not violate
the Due Process Clause). But see Ryder v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 2031, 2038
(1995) (reversing a conviction by court-martial because judges not appointed ac-
cording to dictates of Appointments Clause).
76. See, eg., Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,507-10 (1986) (upholding mil-
itary's authority to prohibit the wearing of a yarmulke by officer while on duty).
77. See, eg., Brown v. Glines, 444 U.S. 348, 354-58 (1980) (allowing military to
prohibit the distribution of petitions on Air Force buses).
78. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57 (1981).
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military installations in the face of challenges to the lack of due pro-
cess79 and the deprivation of First Amendment rights.8 0
The Court understands that many of these decisions are either
made by the civilian leadership or subject to civilian review. How-
ever, the reality is that Congress may be quite content to take the
lead of the uniformed military on many of these matters. Quite pos-
sibly, the further removed civilian leaders are from first-hand expe-
rience with the military, the more likely they are to defer to military
expertise.
VII. CONCLUSION
Is America's military force fated to be run by citizens without mil-
itary service? The evidence would suggest such a conclusion.
In theory, the recently retired career soldier may be an attractive
political candidate. Witness Colin Powell. But the professional sol-
dier also brings some disadvantages, as General Al ("I'm in charge
here") Haig discovered in an aborted 1988 presidential campaign
that rarely saw his poll ratings rise above low single digits. Or wit-
ness the defeat of retired Brigadier General Peter Dawkins in the
New Jersey Senate race of 1992. Dawkins seemingly offered every-
thing: West Point football All-American, Rhodes Scholar, combat
experience, fast track promotions to general, and then private sector
business experience before looking to politics. Yet he lost to an in-
cumbent who almost certainly will make no one's list of influential
statesmen of the century. As scholars have observed, it is the rare
military careerist who achieves marked political success.8 1
What of the short-time soldier (the one-term officer or enlisted
person)? These veterans have been the core of the connection be-
tween military and civilian leadership for the past half-century.
Now their numbers are becoming scarce.
The record to date of the volunteer era legislators suggests that
military service has ceased to be an essential part of the political
r6sum6. In theory, military service is still attractive. In the modem
practice of politics, however, it is open to question whether veterans
are likely to get nominated or elected. Aspects of military service
cut against building a political r6sum6. Consider what ten (or even
five) years in the military is likely to do for the potential candidate.
Active military service will almost invariably take the future candi-
date away from his or her home district, pay only modestly, limit
political activity while in service, and significantly constrain the op-
79. See, e.g., Cafeteria Restaurant Workers Union, Local 473 v. McElroy, 367
U.S. 886 (1961).
80. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976).
81. Morris Janowitz observed in 1960: "To be a professional officer is an almost
insurmountable barrier against election to the national legislature, whereas a war-
time veteran's status is a useful political asset." JANowrrz, supra note 3, at 358.
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portunities for even regional visibility. How many thirty-five-year-
old people whose career has been in the military can realistically
play in congressional elective politics? No money, few contacts, no
name recognition, and no political base don't describe many con-
temporary winning candidates.
The veteran must also recognize that prior military service may
raise some political disadvantages with important constituents. No
modem veteran can claim the politically appealing status of the
draftee or forced volunteer. The decision to elect military service
over other career options reflects political attitudes. The military
service itself may raise red flags from women's groups (recall that
we have no women veterans in Congress), gay and lesbian groups,
pacifists, environmental groups, anti-federal government folk, and
others. These factors may be insignificant in some districts or states.
They may be outweighed by the benefits of military service in
others. Nevertheless, the veteran does carry some baggage.
Similar factors may discourage judicial appointments of military
veterans. The classic wisdom that a federal judge is a lawyer who
knew a senator remains accurate. Political connections (and, in-
creasingly, money) are useful. The military career offers few of
either.
What may preserve the veteran presence in government are the
reserves and National Guard. Here, active duty service is short. An
initial training assignment is followed by weeknight, weekend, and
two-week summer refreshers, and the possibility of mobilization for
wartime. The reservist or guardsman can continue the civilian ca-
reer, keep a home base, and engage in some political activity.
The seemingly inevitable decline of a veteran presence also sug-
gests the need for active steps to recruit and support veteran candi-
dates, executive branch appointees, and judicial nominees. Two
centuries ago similar thoughts gave rise to the Order of the Cincin-
nati, a organization of Revolutionary War veterans.' The more ex-
treme among its sponsors envisioned a military aristocracy to rule
the new nation.8 George Washington and others steered the organ-
ization away from such tendencies to the benefit of the Republic.'
Today, the necessity of encouraging veterans to participate in ci-
vilian government services stems not from a desire for dominance,
but from a desire to avoid losing a military perspective altogether.
The political factors discussed earlier also suggest these efforts may
only slightly improve veterans' presence in government. They also
suggest that the candidates likely to be successful are those with at-
tractive political attributes and a military record, not someone
whose main credential is prior military service.
82. See FRANK DONOVAN, THE GEORGE WASHINGTON PAPES 190-91 (1964).
83. See id.
84. See id.
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The larger concern involves how to acquaint the non-veteran gov-
ernment officials with the military and military issues. The military
itself may be happy to perform this mission, especially when budget
dollars hang in the balance. And the military can do public relations
brilliantly. Few day-care center tours or mine reclamation projects
can compete with a carrier visit or an A-10 flyover.
Such show and tell is useful, but hardly ideal. What is needed is a
more balanced and sustained exposure to the strengths and short-
comings of the military. That will not assure flawless decision-mak-
ing. But it will offer the best chance for preserving healthy military-
civilian relations in the twenty-first century.
